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Introduction & Context 
A methodology is described that combine a framework for hazard identification applying 
functional modelling and environmental assessment applying life cycle assessment. This 
framework is applicable from the early stages in a products design, but can be continuously 
extended throughout the entire life cycle of the new product.  The methodology is exemplified 
by the development of a new safety valve being developed in the AIRPIPE project by a 
European consortium (GRD1-2001-40774). Especially for components that will be used in 
safety critical areas, it is important to have an early assessment of the reliability and safety 
aspects. At this stage, it is commonly agreed that changes in a concept will be more easily 
implemented at lesser costs, and one should therefore also include the topics concerning 
sustainable production dealing with the environmental aspects and occupational health.  
 
 
Method 
The main principle for any life cycle (LCA) and safety assessment (SA) is the systematic 
collection of data relevant for conducting the analysis and assessment of environmental 
impacts and safety of technological processes. LCA and SA are therefore a good basis for the 
decision support process to find the best technological solution for a certain application within 
a socio-technological system. 
 
For the present framework two established methods for SA and LCA are used: the variant of 
functional modelling for hazard identification described by Rasmussen and Whetton7 and the 
EDIP method8, respectively.  
 
Briefly, the basic approach for the functional modelling is to sub-divide a technical system into 
functional subsystems. For each function called “Item” , the “Input” into and the “Output” from 
the function is analysed and listed. Also listed are the “Methods” to sustain the function and 
the “Constraints” that have to be regarded.  
 
The basic approach conducting a LCA is to model the lifetime of a product typically dealing 
with occupational safety, energy demands, material flows, pollution and costs using a supply 
 
7 Rasmussen, Whetton; (1997)”Hazard Identification Based on Plant Functional Modelling” 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 55, 77-84   
8 EDIP = Environmental Design of Industrial Products in Wenzel, Hauschild, Alting (1997) 
“Environmental Assessment of Products” Vol. 1, Kluwer academic publishers 
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chain model, starting from the extraction of raw materials, over the manufacturing processes, 
and ending with the waste treatment of the product regarded. This approach is close to the 
functional modelling method, as each step in the supply chain can also be regarded as a 
“function”. 
 
By that it is possible to develop a combined model with the potential of increasing the level of 
detail by introducing a more specified subsystem, depending on the accessibility of data. 
 
 
 
Results 
In figure 1 the overall and coarse example of a pipeline model is indicating the input to and 
output from the system. Also methods and constraints that apply to the pipeline model are 
shown. In figure 2 the method “Emergency stop of gas flow” is further analysed and  the 
different possible solutions are indicated (solution space). By that both the analysis for hazard 
and the methods used in LCA can be applied at later stages of the assessment. 
 
Component: Piping system 
Function:Transport of gas
Input:
Gas from well
Output:
Gas to customers
Constraints (e.g.):
•Max.gas pressure
•Max. temperature
•Max. gas flow
Methods (e.g.):
•Compressors
•Maintenance
•Surveillance by detectors
•Emergency stop of  gas flow
 
Figure 6 Example for a functional representation of an overall pipeline system. The 
bolded method is modelled further in the next figure. 
 
Input:
Activation signal
Component: Gasgenerator activated valve n
Component: Gasgenerator activated valvel 2
Component: quick shutting  valve
Function: Emergency stop of gas flow
Output:
Interruption of gas flow
in piping system
Constraints (e.g.):
•Normal gas pressures
•False activation
Methods (e.g.):
•Maintenance of valve
•Gasgenerator activated valves
•Other valves
Component: Gasgenerator activated valve 1
Function: Emergency stop of  gas flow
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Figure 7 Example for the functional breakdown of the method “Emergency stop of gas 
flow”. For the sub method “gas generator activated valves” a range of different 
solutions are indicated that make up the solution space that can fulfil the function (or 
service) to stop the gas flow.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1 For each function/component the possible hazards are identified using a key word list 
and an inventory is established. The inventory is the basic step for a LCA and provides first 
knowledge on potential occupational and environmental hazards.  
FUNCTION HAZARD IDENTIFICATION (SA part) INVENTORY (LCA part) 
Ref T Component k key 
word 
Main 
deviation 
Consequ
ens 
Mitigation Material 
        Name Un
it 
Quanti
ty 
Valve 
1 
 Combustio
n chamber 
 Pressur
e 
above 
specificat
ion 
explosion higher 
specificat
ion 
steel kg 2,3 
Valve 
1 
 Pyrrotechni
cs 
 Vibratio
ns 
pulverize
d 
granulate 
faster 
combusti
on 
avoid 
vibrations
GZT 
Cu(NO3)2*Cu(OH
)2 
Zinkstearat 
kg 0,2 
0,7 
0.02 
(…)           
 
The analysis of the model can be listed as shown in table 1 and being analysed depending on 
the overall objectives. The table can be extended for other types of data depending on the 
objectives and scope of the analysis. 
 
Discussions 
Above it is shown how to combine a LCA and SA. In the early phases of a product 
development only insufficient data are available and therefore also the LCA/SA will be coarse, 
but new details and new knowledge on the system easily can be included into the model. By 
that it is possible to collect continuously and store relevant data throughout the whole life time 
of a product.  
 
Conclusion & Perspectives 
It is shown how to combine a life cycle assessment to analyse mostly environmental and 
occupational health problems including cost factors with a safety assessment regarding 
mostly the potential hazards and reliability of the product being used in a socio-technologic 
system. Combining these two approaches ensures that decisions are made on a more 
complete basis using one model database. 
